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Abstract
In this paper we examine an enactive approach to social cog-
nition, a species of radical embodied cognition typically pro-
posed as an alternative to traditional cognitive science. Ac-
cording to enactivists, social cognition is best explained by
reference to the social unit rather than the individuals that par-
ticipate in it. We identify a methodological problem in this
approach, namely a lack of clarity with respect to the model
of explanation it adopts. We review two complaints about
a mechanistic explanatory framework, popular in traditional
cognitive science, that prevent enactivists from embracing it.
We argue that these complaints are unfounded and propose a
conceptual model of enactive mechanistic explanation of so-
cial cognition.
Keywords: enactivism; social cognition; mechanistic expla-
nation
Introduction
Embodied Cognition (EC) is most generally a plea to ac-
knowledge that the states of the body and the environment
can influence cognition and that lower sensorimotor knowl-
edge plays a role in higher cognition like language and rea-
soning (e.g. Eerland, Guadalupe, & Zwaan, 2011). Radical
Embodied Cognition (REC) is the claim that the body and
the environment are actually part of cognition and as a re-
sult, for example, there is no need to have internal represen-
tations of the environment (Wilson & Golonka, 2013; van
Dijk, Kerkhofs, van Rooij, & Haselager, 2008). Enactivism
is a strand of REC that stems from the early work in phi-
losophy of biology of Maturana and Varela (1980) and was
popularized as an alternative to traditional cognitive science
by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991). It shares theoreti-
cal commitments with complex systems theory, phenomenol-
ogy and Buddhist tradition in, on the one hand, grounding
cognition on the organizational principles of living systems
while at the same time giving a prominent role to the inves-
tigation of human experience. Three main principles adopted
by enactivism are (1) challenging the dichotomy between in-
ternal components of the system and its external conditions,
instead stressing the interaction between the two, (2) empha-
sizing emergent properties on higher levels of organization
and (3) viewing the organism as an active autonomous entity
that is able to adaptively maintain itself in the environment1.
We think enactivism has a lot to offer to the study of cog-
nition because it is an approach that is both naturalistic and
1For an accessible introduction to enactivism see (McGee, 2005).
non-reductionist. However, in this paper we highlight its
methodological weakness that might be preventing it from
gaining popularity, namely a lack of explicit commitment to
how cognitive phenomena are to be explained. We exem-
plify this issue using a case of enactive accounts of social
cognition. We further point out that contemporary cognitive
science has two major explanatory frameworks on offer: a
deductive-nomological framework, typically associated with
REC, and a mechanistic framework, typically adopted by tra-
ditional cognitive scientists. We suggest that given the simi-
larity between enactivists and other REC-ers, it is likely that
enactivists implicitly subscribe to the deductive-nomological
framework. In contrast to this, we argue that the mechanistic
framework is not only compatible with enactivism but also
preferable. We consider two main objections raised by REC-
ers against mechanistic explanation and show that they rely
on a misunderstanding of what such an explanation entails.
We end the paper with a preliminary picture of enactive mech-
anistic explanation of social cognition.
Enactive Social Cognition
In broadest terms, a non-EC view on social cognition assumes
that humans can interact with others successfully only if they
are able to see other people as beings with mental states, can
infer these states using a so-called ‘theory of mind’ or sim-
ulation and plug in the results of such inferences in plan-
ning their own actions. A regular EC view denies the need
for such complex representations and inferences emphasizing
real-time interaction with other people and perceptual infor-
mation available in such settings. Certain varieties of simula-
tion accounts of mindreading fit into this framework.
What distinguishes a REC approach is an insistence that
the particular dynamics of social interaction themselves play
a crucial role in explaining social cognition. This is because
“becoming a temporary unit of social action with another per-
son also involves creation of a new perception-action sys-
tem with new capabilities ” (Marsh, Johnston, Richardson,
& Schmidt, 2009, p. 1219). Theoretically this has lead to a
claim that there is no need to represent other people or their
perspective on the world in order to coordinate with them suc-
cessfully. Methodologically, it has been suggested that the
correct level of analysis in the study of social cognition is the
social unit, rather than an exclusive focus on the individuals
that comprise it. Instead of searching for internal properties
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Figure 1: Perceptual crossing experiment.
A pair of blind-folded participants (call them A and B) are asked
to interact in a one-dimensional horizontal field in which they can
move using a computer mouse. The field is perceived solely via
tactile feedback: encountering a stimulus produces a vibration. Par-
ticipant A can sense 3 kinds of stimuli: a static object, B’s avatar and
B’s “shadow” that follows B’s avatar movement but does not provide
B with sensation (the situation is analogous for B). Participants are
asked to click when they think to be in contact with the other’s avatar.
A typical strategy is to move back and forth, especially when a stim-
ulus is encountered. This allows for discriminating between a static
and mobile object (if the stimulation changes despite the participant
staying in place, the object is not static). The results also show that
participants click more often when encountering the other’s avatar
compared to the other avatar’s shadow. However, this increased cor-
rect clicking is not due to better recognition (the relative probability
of clicking on the avatar is not higher) but rather because the avatars
spend more time in front of each other. This effect emerges because
the situation of ‘sensing the other’ while ‘being sensed’ is more sta-
ble than sensing an insensitive shadow. The task is solved globally
even if participants are not conscious of this effect and if the solution
does not appear in an individual behavioral measure.
of individual independent cognizers, we are to investigate the
social interconnectivity that emerges as a result of the inter-
action and constrains individual-level behavior from the level
of a new overarching structure.
One of the most distinctive empirical paradigms that exem-
plifies this idea is a perceptual crossing (PC) study (Auvray
& Rohde, 2012) presented in Figure 1, in which the task is to
distinguish another agent from inanimate objects. A frequent
assumption in traditional explanations of social cognition is
that such a recognition is accomplished by some special cog-
nitive module (e.g. a module of agency or animacy detection)
that is a precondition for interacting successfully. The results
of the PC experiment (see Figure 1 caption and the original
article for details) have been interpreted to show the reverse:
that the social interaction itself and its particular dynamics
constitute a solution to such a task. Therefore, in the oft-
repeated claim by enactivists, social interaction constitutes
social cognition.
Despite a theoretical and empirical research program on
social cognition, we believe so far enactivists have not
been sufficiently explicit about the explanatory methodol-
ogy they subscribe to, by which we mean clarity on what is
their explanatory target and what constitutes an explanation
(Cummins, 2000; Wright & Bechtel, 2007).
Since social interaction is proposed as an explanation, it
cannot be what enactivists are trying to explain. It would
mean that the explanandum is perhaps social cognition or ex-
perience but these are traditionally understood as individual-
level phenomena2. If an explanandum is to be re-construed
on a supra-personal level, we need an account of social cogni-
tion on that level (without equating it with social interaction).
Enactivists could, for example, take more precisely defined
types of interaction as their phenomena of interest (cooper-
ation, competition, exchange) and then seek non-individual
explanations for their emergence. Our proposal discussed in
the last section is to shift to a multi-level explanandum.
Moving on to the model of explanation, an explicit com-
mitment on what constitutes an (good) explanation is impor-
tant so that any given instance can be judged as to whether it
succeeds. In contemporary cognitive science two explanatory
frameworks have been discussed most widely: a deductive-
nomological (DN) and a mechanistic one (Cummins, 2000)3.
According to a DN framework, explaining a particular phe-
nomenon proceeds by citing relevant general laws, the details
of particular circumstances, and how the phenomenon is to be
expected given these two pieces of knowledge. Such an ex-
planation has a form of a deductive argument that derives the
explanandum from a certain law taken as a premise (Hempel,
1965). Many REC-ers have explicitly argued for adopting the
DN framework for explaining cognition (Walmsley, 2008).
By contrast, in a mechanistic framework, one wants to
know not just that a certain regularity holds and what it is
but also why it holds and how it is implemented. An answer
to this question is sought in identifying a mechanism, where:
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in
virtue of its component parts, component operations,
and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of
the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenom-
ena (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 423).
Enactivists have not explicitly accepted or rejected either
of the frameworks. However, given the similarity between
them and other proponents of REC, it seems safe to assume
that their implicit notion of explanation is likely closer to the
DN framework. We now proceed to considering the reasons
behind this preference and show that in fact there can be en-
active mechanistic explanations.
2This interpretation is suggested by a version of the task by
(Froese, Iizuka, & Ikegami, 2014) in which participants’ experience
of the other’s presence is one of the dependent variables.
3The reader should be aware that this is a necessary over-
simplification of the variety of positions held within philosophy
of science overall and that even within cognitive science there
are heated debates on the precise understanding of deductive-
nomological, probabilistic, rational, mechanistic and other explana-
tions. We merely focus on the distinction that has been most widely
used in discussions between traditional cognitive science and REC.
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Enactivist Worries about Mechanistic
Explanation
Since space is limited we will focus on just two worries that
prevent enactivists from adopting a mechanistic approach.
We acknowledge that there are other issues that could be
raised (e.g. the role of representations in mechanistic expla-
nation) but our reply to them would be similar in spirit to
what we offer here: that the notion of mechanism is richer and
more flexible than typical complaints about it presuppose.
The Decomposability Worry
The main worry enactivists and other REC-ers seem to have
with the mechanistic approach is that it allegedly views cog-
nitive systems as decomposable or near-decomposable while
in reality they are non-decomposable. For example, Lamb
and Chemero (2014) argue that according to the mechanists,
producing an explanation requires (1) “decomposition [that]
involves developing a model of a system’s behavior by iden-
tifying discrete component parts and their linear, or weakly
non-linear, interactions” and (2) “localization [that] involves
mapping those discrete components and interactions onto fea-
tures of a physical system” (pp. 809-810). What is often
added to this charge is that such an explanatory strategy views
cognitive systems as component-dominant, i.e. the behavior
of the whole is a simple additive result of the behavior of
its components, whose properties and functions are rigid and
pre-determined (Favela, 2015). Therefore, a single compo-
nent can be analyzed in isolation as responsible for some par-
ticular capacity of the system.
In an opposition to this view on the brain and cognition,
REC-ers argue that in fact living cognitive systems are non-
decomposable into components and interaction-dominant.
That is, the behavior of the whole is more than a simple sum
of the parts because interactions between parts are mostly
non-linear, the behavior of each part dynamically depends on
all other parts of the system and it is not possible to assign any
specific task to any component. Therefore, interactions be-
tween components are more important than the components
themselves (Richardson & Chemero, 2014)4.
If neural and cognitive systems are indeed non-
decomposable and mechanistic framework can only be ap-
plied to decomposable systems, then obviously enactivists
cannot make use of it. However, these arguments betray a
misunderstanding of the mechanistic framework and explicit
dismissal of the new developments in this field.
First of all, mechanists explicitly argue against mere ag-
gregation of components and place heavy emphasis on their
organization (Wimsatt, 1997). It is because the way parts are
organized in space and time that they together can exhibit be-
4This view composed of several statements can of course be
translated into a continuum of positions. Arguing against the ex-
planatory primacy of components might mean rejecting explanations
that (a) ignore interactions, (b) assume only linear interactions, (c)
assume only static interactions ignoring dynamics, (d) ignore the
effect of parameters external to the system. We thank anonymous
reviewer for pointing this out.
havior that they cannot exhibit on their own. It is because the
parts are on a lower level than the whole they comprise that
they cannot have the same properties (cf. the properties of
hydrogen and oxygen vs water).
Second, there is no reason to suppose that only linear and
sequential modes of organization are allowed in mechanisms.
Especially when dealing with biological mechanisms, non-
linear and cyclic modes are ever-present. Such a focus on bi-
ology has led mechanists to stress the necessity for dynamic
mechanistic explanation because in a system organized non-
linearly “the operations performed by parts of the mecha-
nism vary dynamically, depending on activity elsewhere in
the mechanism” (Bechtel, 2011, p. 551). Therefore, an ex-
planation has to include not just a static diagram of compo-
nents and their organization but also a description of how the
functioning of these parts is orchestrated in time, including
potential shifts of the overall functional organization. Adding
dynamics to a mechanistic explanation does not turn it into a
law-based explanation (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2010, 2011).
The general thrust of these extensions of the mechanistic
framework is to stress that cognitive systems are likely to lie
on a continuum between the extremes of non-decomposable
and fully-decomposable. They are, instead, integrated sys-
tems, in which it is still possible to identify components but
their functions are not necessarily predetermined and fixed.
Nor is there a trivial additive relationship between compo-
nent sub-functions and the overall phenomenon. Rather, their
contribution to the operation of the whole might dynamically
depend on other parts of the system, the larger context and be
variable in time. It does not mean that when studying a mech-
anism for a particular phenomenon it is impossible to identify
these contributions (see also Menary, 2007).
In reply to such arguments, Lamb and Chemero (2014)
state that
If a neo-mechanist wishes to discard the condition of de-
composability, then she does so at the cost of discarding
the feature of neo-mechanistic explanations that makes
them distinct from more general accounts of naturalistic
explanation (p. 813).
We wish to oppose this complaint. First, it is unreason-
able to expect that a certain concept or theory once pro-
posed cannot be developed further. Second, what is dis-
tinctive about mechanistic explanations is not decomposabil-
ity but a concern for causal structure underlying the phe-
nomenon5, and for explaining how things work rather than
merely stating what are the laws. Finally, specific for the
topic of this paper, a REC-er has yet to justify to what ex-
tent non-decomposability applies to social cognition, even if
it holds for the brain.
5We should note here that it might be that the mechanistic ap-
proach and enactivism rely on different notions of causality that
make them incompatible. Addressing this possibility would require
not merely examining the respective commitments but also the plau-
sibility of particular models of causality assumed, e.g. whether cir-
cular causality typically adopted by enactivists is a helpful notion.
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The Extended Cognition Worry
The second major worry enactivists have about mechanistic
explanation has to do with the claim that social interaction
itself constitutes social cognition. This is in line with a gen-
eral REC view that cognition is not done by the brain alone
but by an extended brain-body-environment system. In the
case of social cognition, it is rather an extended brain-body-
environment-body-brain system (Froese, Iizuka, & Ikegami,
2013). The fear is that perhaps mechanistic framework some-
how precludes such an extended conception of cognition.
The worry is seemingly justified by the following critique
by Herschbach (2012). In his article on social cognition
sub-titled “A mechanistic alternative to enactivism” (empha-
sis added), he very acutely points out that enactivists have
not been very clear on what they mean by constitution in
their claim that “social interaction constitutes social cogni-
tion”. Constitution is standardly taken to imply a part-whole
relationship and if the claim is that supra-personal interac-
tion constitutes individual cognition, then it is somehow a
category mistake and a confusion of levels of organization.
On the other hand, if constitution is aimed at emphasiz-
ing the causal links between agents engaged in the interac-
tion, then enactivists are committing a well-known coupling-
constitution fallacy (Adams & Aizawa, 2010). In this fallacy,
frequently ascribed to proponents of extended cognition in
general, one points out extensive causal coupling between a
cognitive agent and some external factors and then concludes
that therefore these factors are part of cognition. Such a con-
clusion is thought to be unwarranted because coupling and
constitutive relations are in general not equivalent.
Herschbach proposes that adopting a mechanistic frame-
work can capture everything that enactivists want to say about
social interaction without committing the fallacy. He states
that perceptual crossing example would be described by a
mechanist as a network composed of interacting agents to be
explained by focusing on the agents, their behavior and orga-
nization. A mechanist would then move one level down to the
internal mechanisms of the agents and how they produce the
particular behavior observed in the experiment in response to
particular sensory input. The main point of difference be-
tween enactivists and mechanists, according to Herschbach,
is that while the former would like to say that the environ-
mental input constitutes social cognition, the latter would say
that only the agent-internal mechanism constitutes the phe-
nomenon of interest (the behavior exhibited in the experi-
ment) while the environmental input is merely an external
influence on that mechanism. That is, the mechanism suc-
ceeds only when situated in the appropriate social context of
having contact with another agent.
Herschbach grounds this conclusion on the fact that only
parts that participate in a self-organized autonomous indi-
vidual can be truly said to constitute cognition. He follows
Bechtel (2009) who has argued that it is the autonomous liv-
ing system that is the proper “locus of control”, differenti-
ated from the environment, because it is the living system
that needs to maintain itself as a unity in constantly changing
external conditions.
If adopting a mechanistic framework were to indeed pre-
clude speaking of social interaction playing a constitutive
role, enactivists would not be able to accept it. However, we
believe there are reasons to oppose Herschbach’s conclusion.
The first most obvious reply to Herschbach is that he is re-
placing the enactive explanandum with his own by switching
from the phenomenon of interest being social interaction as
a whole to the behavior of the individual. Even though enac-
tivists have not been very clear on their exact explanandum,
they would definitely resist this move from the higher to the
lower level.
Furthermore, regarding autonomy as a guide to the bound-
aries of cognition, both Herschbach and Bechtel misunder-
stand the notion of autonomy adopted by enactivists. Liv-
ing systems are autonomous in being self-determined rather
than being steered from outside (Bechtel’s “locus of con-
trol”). However, they are also autonomous in being oper-
ationally closed, that is, organized in a circular manner, in
which the processes and components that constitute the sys-
tem are themselves constituted by that system. This, how-
ever, applies not just to the bio-chemical processes of self-
maintenance, but also to the closure of the sensorimotor loop
of the organism. This loop is closed not to the environment
but through the environment, which is merely an additional
step in the loop, not an input or output external to the system
(see Villalobos & Ward, 2015, for a more detailed argument).
The point here is that enactivist autonomy does allow for the
constitutive role of the environment in the cognitive process.
Finally, to respond to Herschbach from within a mecha-
nistic framework itself is to point at the recent literature that
treats the coupling-constitution fallacy as an instance of a
general problem of demarcating the boundaries of a mech-
anism (Kaplan, 2012). In short, what is required to allow for
deciding what constitutes part of the mechanism is an account
of constitutive explanatory relevance, i.e. a way to determine
which components and processes are relevant to a particular
mechanistic explanation (Craver, 2007). This does not need
to be a priori based on deciding what cognition really is and
whether it really extends beyond the brain. In fact, it is even
possible to develop a deflationary (yet still mechanistic) ac-
count which shows how certain kinds of dynamic non-linear
coupling just are constitutive (Kirchhoff, 2016).
In sum, contra Herschbach (2012), adopting the mecha-
nistic framework does not in fact necessitate abandoning the
constitutive role of social interaction in social cognition.
The Enactive Mechanisms Proposal
We believe enactive mechanistic explanation is possible as
there is sufficient basis on both sides of the debate for such
a reconciliation. Constructing such an account requires two
things. First, it requires disambiguation of the notion of
‘composition’ involved in mechanistic explanations to rec-
ognize its compatibility with enactivist claims about non-
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Figure 2: Traditional social cognition. Figure 3: Enactive social cognition.
decomposability of cognitive systems. Identifying compo-
nents in a cognitive system does not necessarily entail that
these components are self-contained, so that the mechanism
is a mere linear addition and causal interrelation of them. We
can just as well identify components that are defined by their
role in the overall whole. This latter, holistic, notion of ‘com-
ponent’ is in line with enactivism. Crucially, though, it does
leave room for a mechanistic explanation. Secondly, a tai-
loring of the mechanistic framework is required to fit wider
enactivist commitments, such as, for example, making room
for cognitive mechanisms that are non-representational and
extended. This reorientation towards mechanisms can be ad-
vantageous to enactivists for several reasons.
First, it equips enactivism with an explicit and coherent ex-
planatory framework, which comes with specific tools and
strategies for constructing explanations of cognitive phenom-
ena. For example, mechanistic literature on mutual manipula-
bility as a guide to constitutive relevance (Craver, 2007) can
help make clear what elements of individual cognition and
social interaction are essential to particular tasks. Similarly,
discussions on how to think of inter-level causation (Craver
& Bechtel, 2007) can help understand the autonomy of the
supra-personal level that enactivists consider important.
Second, the claim that social interaction itself should con-
stitute the primary level of explanation in enactive work on
sociality to some extent encourages ignoring the individual
mechanisms. By contrast, mechanistic emphasis on working
parts and their operations highlights the need to provide a dis-
tinctively enactive account of what goes on in the individual
brains and bodies, i.e. offer a truly multi-level explanation for
a multi-level explanandum. Otherwise, a traditional cognitive
scientist might well acknowledge the role of interaction but
combine that with a non-enactive account of internal mecha-
nisms, thereby defying the whole purpose of constructing an
explanatorily complete enactive cognitive science.
Third, enactive mechanistic explanation promotes integra-
tion with the rest of cognitive science while at the same time
making clear how enactive explanations are different from
traditional ones. That is, competing explanations could now
be formulated in the same language and compared, instead
of two communities adopting completely different explana-
tory frameworks and talking past each other. This is not to
say that dynamical, more law-oriented approaches are to be
eliminated and we definitely see value in a pluralistic attitude
(Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009). However, we think at
least some intersection is essential for continued progress.
The ‘commensurability’ of mechanistic enactivism and tra-
ditional cognitive science can be illustrated schematically.
Figure 2 represents a traditional cognitive science approach
to social cognition. All the components of the cognitive
mechanisms (differently colored cogs) are located inside the
agents’ brains. Succeeding in a social task requires one agent
to “replicate” the cogs of the other agent inside their own
brain, i.e. internally represent the mental states of the other
by means of “theory of mind” or simulation. The replicated
cogs will not be the same as the original ones (hence the blur-
riness) but need to be sufficiently close if the agents are to
interact successfully. The unfolding of the interaction is then
explained in terms of the operations of this internal machin-
ery, giving a strong impression that once all the cogs are in
place, the whole process might as well proceed offline.
The contrasting enactive mechanistic view is depicted in
Figure 3. Here the explanandum is particular kinds of so-
cial interactions in which the individuals participate. The ex-
planation is to be achieved by specifying all the components
of the picture that contribute to the realization of such inter-
actions. The components of the cognitive mechanisms (the
cogs) are distributed across the brain and the body of both
agents and dynamically coupled (the toothed belt), respect-
ing the enactivist rejection of the internal-external dichotomy.
The contribution of the individual brains to the overall social
interaction is diminished with respect to the previous figure,
suggesting a need for an alternative account of such internal
mechanisms. The fact that the coupling is a constraint on in-
dividual mechanisms rather than an additional cog, expresses
the idea that interaction consists of interacting individuals yet
allowing for emergent effects. Furthermore, the picture in-
cludes the possibility that the coupling might be affected by
contextual factors (the tension pulley), such as the layout of
the environment in which interaction unfolds, or some socio-
cultural circumstances.
To restate the point of our paper in terms of the second
figure above, we believe the current state of the matters in en-
activist theorizing about social cognition is an exclusive focus
on the toothed belt. We think the time is ripe to start examin-
ing the rest of the picture.
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